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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SMITH & EDWARDS COMPANY, : 
and/or WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
FUND OF UTAH, t Case No. 880114-CA 
Defendants/Appellants, : 
v. i 
DOUGLAS YOUNGFIELD, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTA 
Category No. 6 
Respondents. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from an order of *he Industrial 
Commission of Utah awarding workers' compensation r 
app 1 i can 1:, Do 1 1 g ] a s i oung f i e ] d
 t f oi: i i i j u:i : i e s i: e c e i v ed d 1 ir I ng the ' 
course of his employment i n accordance with Utah Code Ann, % 1S-
1 4 5 (1988). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utdh rndo Ann V, l'i I HI. (1MHH Iij-'lhh lh (Supp. 1987) 
and 78-2a-3(a) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the Industrial Commission properly found 
Mr, >'" oungf i t\l ci' t injury to 1>Q the result of an accident. 
2 Whether the Industrial Commission properly found a 
legal causal connection between Mi Younql i old s minis UTKI Ins 
employment. 
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1 
3. Whether not referring the issue of medical 
causation to a medical panel can represent an abuse of discretion 
where the ALJ followed the Industrial Commission's rules and 
regulations. 
4. Whether evidence of medical causation is 
sufficiently established in the record. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1988). 
3. Utah Admin. Code R490-2-18 (1987). 
(The above provisions are reproduced verbatim in the 
addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On February 5, 1987f applicant, Douglas Youngfield was 
injured in an industrial accident while employed by the Smith & 
Edwards Company (R. 3, 14). Applicant filed for a hearing before 
the Industrial Commission of Utah because his employer's 
insurance carrier refused to accept his claim (R. 3, 51). 
i On July 21, 1987 a hearing before Administrative Law 
Judge, Gilbert A. Martinez was conducted. During the course of 
the hearing, Mr. Youngfield testified and exhibits were entered 
into the record on his behalf. Defendants called no witnesses, 
offered no exhibits and did not attempt to produce any evidence. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, a motion was granted allowing 
defendants to supplement the record based on subsequent 
investigations (R. 49). The case was diaried for 30 days (R. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
54). On August 5, 1987 defendants supplemented the record with 
i) the dates of Mr. Youngfield's employment and his earnings and 
ii) an affidavit concerning the weight of the box which Mr. 
Youngfield had lifted causing his injury. 
On October 26, 1987 interim findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and an order were issued; Mr. Youngfield was 
awarded temporary total disability compensation, medical costs 
and attorney fees (R. 137-138). Claims for potential permanent 
partial disability were reserved until Mr. Youngfield had been 
rated by a qualified physician or orthopedic surgeon (R. 138). 
On November 12, 1987, the defendants moved for a review 
of the findings of fact, conclusions of law and order previously 
issued or alternatively for an additional hearing to present 
further evidence with respect to the issue of legal causation (R. 
140-141). The motion was referred to the entire Industrial 
Commission (R. 142). The Industrial Commission denied the motion 
for review and affirmed the Administrative Law Judge's Interim 
Order (R. 143-144). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Douglas Youngfield was born on December 17, 1954 and is 
33 years old (R. 36). On the date of the industrial accident Mr. 
Youngfield was employed by the Smith and Edwards Company and was 
earning a wage of $ 219.48 per week (R. 14, 27, 128). Although 
not married at the time, Mr. Youngfield had one dependant child 
under the age of eighteen (R. 13-14). 
On February 5, 1987, applicant, Mr. Youngfield, during 
the course of his employment, performing his regular duties as a Digitized by th  Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
r 
stock clerk, was lifting cases of shotgun shells from a cart and 
loading them on a pallet (R. 14, 27). Mr. Youngfield testified 
as he lifted one of the boxes of shotgun shells, he turned to his 
left to put the box on the pallet and felt a sharp pain shoot 
from the center of his back down his right leg (R. 15). He 
dropped the box of shells and fell to the floor (R. 15). Mr. 
Youngfield estimated the weight of the individual boxes to be "in 
the neighborhood of 75 to a hundred pounds." (R. 33). The 
actual weight, after an exact weighing, was found to be 47*5 
pounds (R. 126, 132). 
Mr. Youngfield approached his supervisor telling him he 
was unsure whether he would be able to work the rest of the day 
and sought lighter work (R. 15). Although told he could "go 
ahead and go home," Mr. Youngfield finished his shift though 
still experiencing pain (R. 15-16). 
That night Mr. Youngfield had difficulty sleeping due 
to sharp pains in his back, right buttocks and down his right leg 
(R. 16). The pain continued the next day when he returned to 
work. Mr. Youngfield testified, "It was painful for [him] to 
eyen stand." (R. 16). 
Following the accident, sometime between February 7-12, 
1987, Mr. Youngfield sought chiropractic care from Dr. Richard 
Barton (See, R. 17, 62). Mr. Youngfield continued seeing Dr. 
Barton into May, approximately 15 visits (R. 17, 48). 
On February 16, Mr. Youngfield visited Craig Julien, 
M.D.. After observing Mr. Youngfield's condition for two weeks, 
Dr. Julien recommended a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) test 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(R. 17-19, 65). The MRI test revealed a herniated disk and Dr. 
Julien referred Mr. Youngfield to a orthopedic surgeon (R. 31, 
65). 
Mr. Youngfield then had a one time visit Dr. Allison, 
an orthopedic physician and surgeon, who advised Mr. Youngfield 
on surgical possibilities (R. 23, 48). Dr. Allison diagnosed Mr. 
Youngfield as having a low grade S-l radiculopathy on the right, 
and recommended conservative treatment, but stated that, should 
Mr. Youngfield develop intolerable back and leg pain, he could be 
a candidate for myelography and possible surgical intervention 
(R. 31, 73). 
Mr. Youngfield has a history of related and unrelated 
medical conditions. 
In July of 1985, Mr. Youngfield was involved in an 
automobile accident in which he was rear ended (R. 37). After 
the accident Mr. Youngfield complained of mid-back and neck pain 
and received chiropractic treatments from Dr. Margolies for three 
to four months (R. 37, 42, 44). 
In April of 1983, while serving in the Military at Fort 
Carson, Mr. Youngfield was diagnosed as having a potentially 
fatal skin disease known as scleroderma morphea (R. 20, 22). The 
Veterans Administration pays Mr. Youngfield $ 69.00 per month 
based on a 10% disability rating (R. 12). 
In November of 1983, Youngfield received 10 to 12 
chiropractic treatments from Dr. Rick Weum in Colorado Springs 
(R. 45). Dr. Weum's report listed the treatments in response to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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chronic low back pain and upper back pain radiating into the neck 
and shoulders (R. 46, 64). 
And in March of 1977, Mr. Youngfield was X-rayed at St. 
Benedicts' Hospital for a strained lower back (R. 36, 40-41, 86-
90). 
On February 11, 1987 Mr. Youngfield's employment was 
terminated due to a reduction in force (R. 5, 47# 127). Mr. 
Youngfield returned to work for a different employer, The Gift 
House, on May 5, 1987 although still suffering some back pain (R. 
32). His new duties were that of a salesman and pawn loan clerk 
(R. 33). 
To date, Mr. Youngfield has not been paid any 
compensation or received any medical benefits (R. 24, 26). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), 
the Utah Supreme Court interpreted Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 
(1988), the statute which creates a right to workers' 
compensation for persons suffering industrial accidents. In 
Allen, the court stated that the statute creates two 
prerequisites to finding a compensable injury; i) that the injury 
occurred by accident and ii) that a causal connection between the 
injury and worker's duties exist. The second requirement, a 
causal connection, includes both legal and medical causation. 
In the present case, a review of the record and 
relevant case law establish that the ALJ made a proper finding of 
an accident as defined by Allen, in that the accident was "an 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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unexpected or unintended occurrence that may be either the cause 
or the result of an injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 22. 
The ALJ also properly found that a legal causal 
connection existed. Applying an objective standard, the ALJ 
properly determined that Mr. Youngfield's employment duties, 
which included lifting boxes which weighed 47*5 lbs., required an 
exertion which was greater that of nonemployment life. 
The record contains sufficient evidence from which to 
conclude that medical causation exits. Because Mr. Youngfield 
was the only party to offer evidence at the hearing, the evidence 
is unrebutted that a connection between Mr. Youngfield's exertion 
in lifting the box of shotgun shells and his injury exits. 
Furthermore, the ALJ did not abuse his discretion in not 
referring the issue of medical causation to a medical panel. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-77 (1988) establishes that referrals to 
medical panels to determine medical causation is permissive and 
not required in every case. In the present case there can not be 
an abuse of discretion where i) none of the circumstances 
described in Utah Admin. Code R490-2-18 (1987), Guidelines for 
Utilization of Medical Panel, were present and ii) there was no 
-uncertain or highly technical" evidence respecting he issue of 
medical causation. / 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND MR. 
YOUNGFIELD'S INJURY TO BE THE RESULT OF AN 
ACCIDENT. 
The Workers' Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 
(1988) states, "Every employee . . . who is injured . . . by Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
accident arising out of or in the course of his employment . . . 
shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of the 
injury . . . .M In Allen v. Industrial Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court interpreted § 35-1-45 as creating 
two prerequisites to finding a compensable injury. First the 
claimant must prove the injury occurred "by accident." An 
accident, as defined in Allen is "an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of an 
injury." Allen, 729 P.2d at 22 (emphasis in original). 
In the present case, defendants contend that the 
Industrial Commission confused the first prerequisite, a 
necessary finding of an "accident," with the second prerequisite, 
a causal connection between the injury and the employment (Br. 
App. 12). See, Allen, 729 P.2d at 18. Defendants argue: 
Given the respondent's preexisting condition 
and the fact that his chiropractor had warned 
in 1984 that "bending" and "lifting heavy 
objects" . . . would lead to the result 
which occurred on February 5, 1987, it is 
arguable whether the first prerequisite, 
accident, was established. 
(Br. App. 12). A review of the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) 
interim order and relevant case law clearly demonstrate that such 
contention is without merit. 
In Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, 1011 (Utah 
1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Whether the claimant had a preexisting 
condition is relevant to the issue of 
causation, but is not determinative of 
whether the injury occurred "by accident.* 
The key question here is whether the 
occurrence was the unexpected cause or the 
injury or the unexpected result of an 
exertion. The evidence in this case reveals 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that the claimant unexpectedly and without 
any forewarning or anticipation injured his 
back while putting on his coveralls. None of 
the evidence indicated that the claimant had 
experienced repeated pain or injury as with 
an occupational disease or other foreseeable 
injury. Under these circumstances, the 
injury in the case at bar was Mby accident." 
(emphasis added). 
In American Roofing Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 752 P.2d 
912, 914 (Utah App. 1988), this Court heard the argument that 
because the applicant had experienced bolts of pain his lower back 
and legs since a 1983 accident, a subsequent 1985 injury occurring 
when the applicant lifted a bucket of debris was not unexpected 
and therefore not "by accident". This Court held that such an 
injury was not expected or intended, and therefore a finding of 
"by accident" was not arbitrary and capricious but supported by 
the evidence. Icl. at 915. 
And in Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 P.2d 237 (Utah 
1987), the Utah Supreme Court reversed the decision of an ALJ that 
a heart attack was not "by accident" where the claimant had 
experienced similar pains four days earlier. The court stated, 
there is nothing in the claimant's job duties 
f to suggest that he would suffer a heart 
attack. There is overwhelming evidence that 
1
 the claimant did not intend to have a heart 
attack, nor did he anticipate one. These 
factors • /. . require the conclusion that the 
heart attack was by accident. 
Id. at 239. 
In the present case the ALJ took note of the definition 
of accident provided in Allen specifically citing it in his 
interim order, and then stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Applying this standard to the case at bar, 
the Administrative Law Judge finds no 
difficulty in determining that the low back 
injury sustained by Youngfield occurred by 
accident. Certainly, Mr. Youngfield did not 
intend that he should develop low back 
problems in the course of performing his 
regular job duties, which included stocking 
and lifting boxes of shotgun shells. Under 
the standard of Allen, his injuries were the 
unexpected result of exertions which occurred 
at work and in the course of employment. 
(R. 133-134). 
This approach is in perfect harmony with the standard 
set forth in Allen and elaborated on in Hone, American Roofing Co. 
and Lancaster. Clearly, the ALJ's finding the injury in the 
present case was "by accident" is supported by the record and is 
not arbitrary and capricious. 
Moreover, the ALJ, demonstrated proper understanding 
and application of the Allen test when he stated, 
This conclusion [injury "by accident"], 
however, does not completely answer the 
question of whether Mr. Youngfield is 
entitled to benefits under Section 35-1-45. 
As the Utah Supreme Court explained in Allen, 
the second element of a compensable accident 
requires proof of a causal connection between 
the injury and the worker's employment 
duties. . . . The majority then defines the 
term "arising out of or in the course of 
V employment" to impose legal and medical 
?
 causation requirements. 
(R. 134). 
Defendants' contention that the ALJ confused the two 
prerequisites of the Allen test and did not make a proper finding 
that Mr. Youngfield's injury occurred "by accident" is wholly 
without merit. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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II. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION PROPERLY FOUND A 
LEGAL CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN MR. 
YOUNGFIELD'S INJURY AND HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
The second element of a compensable accident requires 
proof of a causal connection between the injury and the worker's 
employment duties. Allen, 729 P.2d at 22 (citation omitted). In 
order to establish the causal connection, the court adopted a two-
prong test which dictates that both legal and medical causation be 
established. ]ji. at 25. 
To establish legal causation the court adopted the 
approach advanced by Professor Larson in Workmen's Compensation 
(1986). 
To meet the legal causation requirement, a 
claimant with a preexisting condition must 
show that the employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk he 
already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. Larson describes the application of the 
rule as follows: 
If there is some personal causal contribution 
in the form of a [preexisting condition], the 
employment contribution must take the form of 
an exertion greater than that of 
nonemployment life. . . . 
t 
If there is no personal causal contribution, 
that is, if there is no prior weakness or 
disease, any exertion connected with the 
employment and causally connected with the 
[injury] as matter of medical fact is 
adequate to satisfy the legal test of 
causation. 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 
In the present case, because Mr. Youngfield suffered 
from preexisting conditions, the proper focus rests on whether the 
exertion necessary to lift the box of shotgun shells weighing 47*5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
lbs, is greater than that of nonemployment life. In making such a 
determination the court emphasized that an objective standard must 
be utilized. Id. 
In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, 
the focus is on what typical nonemployment 
activities are generally expected of people 
in today's society, not what this particular 
claimant is accustomed to doing. Typical 
activities and exertions expected of men and 
women in the latter part of the 20th century, 
for example include taking full garbage cans 
to the street, lifting and carrying baggage 
for travel, changing a flat tire on an 
automobile, lifting a small child to chest 
height and climbing the stairs in buildings. 
By using an objective standard, the case law 
will eventually define a standard for typical 
"nonemployment activity" in much the way case 
law has developed the standard of care for 
the reasonable man in tort law. 
Id. at 26-27. 
In the case at hand the ALJ took judicial notice that 
lifting objects weighing 20 lbs. or less would not satisfy the 
unusual exertion test for a person with a preexisting condition 
mandated by Allen (R. 135, See, Allen, 729 P.2d at 26 footnote 8). 
The ALJ also took judicial notice that lifting objects weighing 80 
lbs. or more would satisfy an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" 
for a Twentieth Century person in non-employment life (R. 135). 
The issue of legal causation ultimately turned on the AU's 
resolution of whether 47*5 lbs., an intermediate weight, satisfied 
the threshold for legal causation. 
The record indicates that the ALJ applied the proper 
standard of preponderance of the evidence in making his 
determination (R. 135, Allen, 729 P.2d at 23). The record is also 
clear that the ALJ applied an objective standard in trying to 
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determine what qualifies as an "unusual exertion" for the typical 
Twentieth Century individual and never attempted to determine to 
what Mr. Youngfield was personally accustomed (R. 135-136). The 
question proved difficult because the objective standard for 
nonemployment activity dictated by Allen remains relatively new 
and case law has not elaborated on the standard beyond the minimal 
guidelines suggested by Allen, i.e. taking full garbage cans to 
the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height 
and climbing the stairs in buildings. See, Allen, 729 P.2d at 26. 
The court in Allen noted, "There is no fixed formula by 
which the causation issue may be resolved, and the issue must be 
determined on the facts of each case." Allen, 729 P.2d at 25. 
Defendants, in order to upset the finding that legal causation 
existed in the present case, are required to demonstrate that the 
decision of the ALJ was arbitrary and capricious. American 
Roofing Co., 752 P.2d at 915; See, Lancaster v. Gilbert Dev., 736 
237 at 241 (Utah 1987). Defendants' assertions that the record 
contains no evidence to support the ALJ's finding of legal 
causation or that the ALJ failed to apply an objective standard 
are not supported by a proper reading of the record. On the 
contrary, the record confirms that the ALJ followed the proper 
steps for determining whether legal causation exits. 
The question of whether the employment 
activities of a given employee are sufficient 
to satisfy the legal standard of unusual or 
extraordinary effort involves two steps. 
First, the agency must determine as a matter 
of fact exactly what were the employment-
related activities of the injured employee. 
Second, the agency must decide whether those Digitize  by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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activities amounted to unusual or 
extraordinary exertion. 
Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 731 P.2d 1079, 1082 
(Utah 1986). The ALJ determined as a matter of fact that Mr. 
Youngfield's employment related duties included lifting boxes of 
shot gun shells (R. 134), and that the exertion required to 
perform that activity was unusual and extraordinary (R. 137). 
Accordingly, the ALJ's finding that legal causation existed could 
not conceivably be held to be arbitrary and capricious and should, 
therefore, be affirmed. 
III. REFERRING THE ISSUE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION TO A 
MEDICAL PANEL CANNOT REPRESENT AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHERE THE ALJ FOLLOWED THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S RULES AND 
REGULATIONS. 
The second prong of the casual connection places the 
burden of showing medical causation on the claimant. However, 
proof of medical causation is not restricted to any one method and 
an applicant is given broad discretion in the type of evidence 
which may be proffered. 
Under the medical cause test, the claimant 
V must show by evidence, opinion or otherwise 
that the stress, strain, or exertion required 
i by his or her occupation led to the resulting 
•f injury or disability. 
Allen, 729 P.2d at 27 (emphasis added). 
In Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 1986), 
the claimant argued the ALJ erred in not referring his case to a 
medical panel. The court noted the reference to a medical panel 
is controlled by statute. 
In 1982, the legislature amended U.C.A. 1953, 
S 35-1-77 and changed the requirement of a 
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mandatory referral to the medical panel to a 
permissive referral. Under the statute as 
now written, "the commission may refer the 
medical aspects of the case to a medical 
panel appointed by the commission." 
Id. at 1012 (Emphasis added). 
Utah Admin. Code R490-2-18 provides as follows: 
Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the 
Commission adopts the following guidelines in 
determining the necessity of submitting a 
case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues 
are involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Significant medical issues 
are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of 
permanent physical impairment which vary more 
than 5% of the whole person; or 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more 
than ninety (90) days; or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy 
amounting to more than $ 2,000. 
2. In the opinion of the Commission, the 
medical issues are so intertwined with the 
events that determination of whether an 
accident has occurred cannot be made without 
first resolving the medical considerations. 
3. Where, in the opinion of the 
Commission, the evidence is insufficient for 
the Commission to make a final determination, 
the Commission may require an independent 
medical evaluation, costs to be assessed 
1
 against the employer and/or Second Injury 
?
 Fund. 
4. A hearing on objections to the panel 
report may be scheduled if there is a proffer 
of conflicting medical testimony or evidence 
showing a need to clarify the medical panel 
report. 
5. The Commission may authorize an injured 
worker to be examined by another physician 
for the purpose of obtaining a further 
medical examination or evaluation pertaining 
to the medical issues involved, and to obtain 
a report addressing these medical issues in 
all cases where: 
(a) The treating physician has failed or Digitized by t e Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
refused to given an impairment rating; 
(b) The employer or doctor considers the 
claim to be non-industrial; 
(c) A substantial injustice may occur 
without such further evaluation. 
In the present case none of the above conditions 
existed which necessitated the need to refer the case to a medical 
panel. In fact, not only was there a lack of significant medical 
issues, a conflict in medical opinions or reports or disputed 
expenses, defendants never challenged the issue of medical 
causation at the evidentiary hearing or in their request for 
review before the entire Industrial Commission. Instead, 
defendants have, until the present appeal, focused all of their 
arguments exclusively on the issue of legal causation. 
Under the circumstances, where the issue of medical 
causation was never challenged and the ALJ properly followed the 
guidelines set forth by the Utah Administrative Rules governing 
referral of a case to a medical panel, the ALJ could not have 
abused his discretion by not referring the case to a medical 
panel. 
Defendants' reliance on Champion Home Builders v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1985), for the 
proposition that referral to a medical panel is necessary in order 
to determine medical causation is unfounded. In the present case, 
evidence of the causal connection was not "uncertain or highly 
technicalH as required by Champion Home Builders. As previously 
mentioned, during the evidentiary hearing Mr. Youngfield offered 
the only testimony. Defendants arguments at the hearing, when 
supplementing the record, and on motion for review, focused 
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exclusively on the issue of legal causation. As a result there 
was no "uncertain or highly technical" evidence respecting the 
issue of medical causation. 
IV. EVIDENCE OF MEDICAL CAUSATION IS SUFFICIENTLY 
ESTABLISHED AND UNREBUTTED IN THE RECORD. 
A proper analysis of medical causation differs 
significantly from legal causation. In medical causation the 
focus is whether "there was a physiological causal linkage between 
the injury and the job activity." Holloway v. Industrial Comm'n, 
729 P.2d 31, 32 (Utah 1986) (J. Zimmerman concurring). Stated in 
other words, the key question in medical causation is whether, 
given the worker's body and worker's exertion, the exertion in 
fact contributed to the injury. Allen, 729 P.2d at 24. Legal 
causation on the other hand, focuses solely on the issue of 
whether the nature of the exertion is sufficient to hold the 
employer legally liable for the resulting injury. Ici. at 25. 
Based on the evidence in the record, as Mr. Youngfield 
lifted a box of shotgun shells, he turned to his left to put the 
box on the pallet and felt a sharp pain shoot from the center of 
his back down his right leg (R. 15). No attempt was ever made to 
rebut this evidence. Given this evidence, the only evidence, the 
record establishes sufficient evidence to conclude that Mr. 
Youngfield's exertion, lifting the box, contributed to his injury. 
Upon review of cases in which the standards established 
in Allen are applied without a previous finding respecting medical 
causation, the Utah Supreme Court has concluded where appropriate 
that medical causation has been established from the record. Utah 
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Transit Authority v. Booth, 728 P.2d 1012, 1014 (Utah 1986); Miera 
v, Industrial Commyn, 728 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Utah 1986); and 
Richfield Care Center v. Torqerson, 733 P.2d 178, 180 (Utah 1987). 
In the present case, although the ALJ did not make a specific 
finding of medical causation, it is amply established by the 
evidence. 
If however, this Court should require a specific 
finding of medical causation before affirming the decision of the 
Industrial Commission, this Court should consider remanding the 
case back to Industrial Commission in order to afford it an 
opportunity to enter its finding which would then become 
reviewable. If this Court does not conclude that medical 
causation is established by the record, such a procedure would be 
most appropriate since the issue of medical causation was never 
contested during the hearing or on defendants' motion for review. 
To allow defendants to overturn the order of Industrial Commission 
on the basis of an argument never presented to the Commission 
would not serve the purposes of appellate review in overseeing the 
correctness of lower court decisions based on the evidence and 




Based on the forgoing arguments, respondent 
respectfully request this Court to affirm the order of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah in awarding applicant, Douglas 
Youngfield workers' compensation benefits, or in the alternative 
to remand the case back to the Industrial Commission allowing it 
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an opportunity to enter findings relevant to medical causation, 
which would then make the case ripe for appellate review. 
Dated this /IJA day of August, 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKENSON 
Attorney General 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed postage prepaid, 
this //d£ day of August, 1988, to the following: 
Douglas Youngfield 
1568 South 2500 West 
Syracuse, Utah 84041 
James R. Black 
Wendy B. Mosely 
Black & Moore 
261 East Broadway, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dennis V. Lloyd 
State Insurance Fund 
560 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator 
?
 Second Injury Fund 
1
 160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0580 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ADDENDUM 
t 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
->.*r &vrr*-a***p&li** ffffWBMBBMK^ 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-45 
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98 Utah 551, 100 r^ 
Injury arising out of or in court* of em-
ployment 
"Act of God" is not by implication excluded 
in Subdivision (5) of this section. State Rd. 
Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Utah 252, 
190 P. 544 (1920). 
Where mine superintendent was killed by 
holdup bandits as he entered 6tore to purchase 
cigar for his own use, his death was not com-
pensable as "accidental" injury within this sec-
tion since in order to recover for accidental in-
jury there must be some causal connection or 
relation between act causing injury and em-
ployment or duties of injured employee. 
Westerdahl v. State Ins Fund, 60 Utah 325, 
208 P. 494 (1922). 
Where state road employee while working on 
road sought shelter from storm and was struck 
by lightning, the accident arose out of and in 
course of employment. State Rd. Comm'n v. In-
dustrial Comm'n, 56 Utah 252, 190 P. 544 
(1920). 
Under Subdivision (5) although an employee 
is employed on the day of an accident, it cannot 
be said he is in the course of his employment 
where he steps aside to engage in an alterca-
tion with some third person concerning a per-
sonal grievance wholly unrelated to matters 
connected with his employment. Wilkerson v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 355, 266 P. 270 
(1928). 
Wife of deceased drugstore employee waa not 
entitled to compensation where she did not sus-
tain burden of proving that typhoid fever was 
result of injury received in course of his em-
ployment. Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 81 
UUh 141, 17 P.2d 205 (1932). 
Death of beer truck driver after being taken 
to the hospital when he had a severe pain in 
his chest after making his second morning de-
livery, did not result from an accident arising 
out of or in the course of his employment, 
where substance of opinions of medical panel 
was that death from coronary thrombosis with 
myocardial infarction was not caused from the 
exertion of deceased's work on that morning. 
Burton v. Industrial Comm'n, 13 Utah 2d 353, 
374 P.2d 439 (1962). 
Regular course of employment 
Bricklayer killed in automobile accident 
while returning home from work was not killed 
in an accident arising out of or in the course of 
employment despite fact that decedent'6 hourly 
wage had been increased due to location of con-
struction site; increased hourly wage did not 
constitute pay for travel time. Barney v. Indus-
trial Comm'n, 29 Utah 2d 179, 506 P.2d 1271 
(1973). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C.J.S. — 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensa-
tion \ 1. 
A.L.R. — Suicide as compensable under 
Workmen's Compensation Act, 15 A.L R.3d 
616. 
Workmen's compensation: injury or death 
due to storms, 42 A L.R 3d 385. 
Workmen's compensation: injury sustained 
while attending employer-sponsored social af-
fair as arising out of and in the course of em-
ployment, 47 A.L.R.3d 566. 
Master and servant: employer's liability for 
injury caused by food or drink purchased by 
employee in plant facilities, 50 A.L.R.3d 505. 
Workers* compensation law as precluding 
employee's suit against employer for third per-
son's criminal attack, 49 A.L R.4th 926. 
Workers' compensation: sexual assaults as 
compensable, 52 A.L.R 4th 731. 
Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
•» 47. 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the depen-
dents of each Buch employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the iryury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospi-
tal services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and 
Payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral 
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insur-
^ce carrier and not on the employee. 
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LABOR — INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
f ! 
11 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or medical con-
sultants — Discretionary authority of commis-
sion to refer case — Findings and reports — Ob-
jections to report — Hearing — Expenses. 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation for injury by accident, or 
for death, arising out of or in the course of employment, and if the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier denies liability, the commission may refer 
the medical aspects of the case to a medical panel appointed by the com-
mission. The panel shall have the qualifications generally applicable to 
the medical panel under Section 35-2-56. 
(b) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evalua-
tion of the medical aspects of a controverted case, the commission in its 
sole discretion may employ a medical director or medical consultants on a 
full-time or part-time basis for the purpose of evaluating the medical 
evidence and advising the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility. If all parties agree to the use of a medical director 
or medical consultants, they shall be allowed to function in the same 
manner and under the same procedures as required of a medical panel. 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make such study, take such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the commission, as it may 
determine to be necessary or desirable. 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or medical consultants shall 
make a report in writing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional findings as the commission 
may require. 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute full copies of the report to 
the applicant, the employer, and its insurance carrier by registered mail 
with return receipt requested. Within 15 days after the report is deposited 
in the United States post office, the applicant, the employer, or its insur-
ance carrier may file with the commission written objections to the re-
port. If no written objections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence. 
(d) The commission may base its finding and decision on the report of 
the panel, medical director, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a 
contrary finding. 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the commission may set the case 
for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved. At the hearing, 
any party so desiring may request the commission to have the chairman 
of the medical panel, the medical director, or the medical consultants 
present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. For good 
cause shown, the commission may order other members of the panel, with 
or without the chairman or the medical director or medical consultants, to 
be present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination. 
(0 The written report of the panel, medical director, or medical consul-
tants may be received as an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is sustained by the testi-
mony admitted. 
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WORKERS' COMPENSATION 35-1-77 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical 
director, or medical consultants and the expenses of their appearance 
before the commission shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 62, I 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 42 1-71.10, L. 1955, ch. 67, ft 1; 1969, 
ch. 86, ft 9; 1979, ch. 138, ft 6; 1982, ch. 41, 
I 1; 1988, ch. 116, ft 7. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
ment, effective July 1, 1988, designated the 
previously undesignated first sentence as Sub-
section (l)(a), the previously undesignated sec-
ond sentence as Subsections (2Ua) and (2Kb), 
the previously undesignated third and fourth 
sentences and the beginning of the previously 
undesignated fifth sentence as Subsection 
(2Mc), the end of the previously undesignated 
fifth sentence as Subsection (2)(d), the previ-
ously undesignated sixth and seventh sen-
tences as Subsection (2)(e), the previously un-
designated eighth sentence as Subsection (2)(f) 
and the previously undesignated ninth sen-
tence as Subsection (2)(g). The amendment 
also, in Subsection (1), added Paragraph (b) 
and, in Paragraph (a), divided the formerly un-
divided language into two sentences and made 
a series of minor stylistic changes; in Subsec-
tion (2)(a), inserted "medical director, or medi-
cal consultanta", substituted "to be necessary 
or desirable** for "and thereafter" and made a 
series of minor stylistic changes; added T h e 
medical panel, medical director, or medical 
consultants shall" at the beginning of Subsec-
tion (2Kb); in Subsection (2Kc), deleted "of the 
panel" following "report" in the first sentence, 
inserted "written" in the last two sentences 
and made a series of minor stylistic changes 
throughout the subsection; in Subsection (2>(d), 
inserted "medical director, or medical consul-
tants", deleted "by the commission" at the end 
and made a series of minor stylistic changes; in 
Subsection (2)(e), divided the former first sen-
tence into the present first two sentences, in-
serted "the medical director, or the medical 
consultants" in the second sentence and "or the 
medical director or medical consultants" in the 
third sentence and made a series of minor sty-
listic changes throughout the subsection; in 
Subsection (2)(f) inserted "medical director, or 
medical consultants" and "at the hearing" and 
made a series of minor stylistic changes; and 
rewrote Subsection (2)(g), which read "The ex-
penses of such study and report by the medical 
panel and of their appearance before the com-
mission shall be paid out of the fund provided 
by ft 35-1-68.* 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Effect of 1982 amendment 
Function of medical panel. 
Mandatory referral to panel. 
Objections to report-
Panel report as evidence. 
Qualifications of panel members. 
Referral to panel. 
—Discretion. 
Report, statements and admission*. 
Supplemental award. 
Cited. 
Duty of commission on remand of case. 
Where an order of the commission was va-
cated and the cause remanded because of a de-
ficiency in the evidence to support the report of 
s medical panel appointed by the commission, 
the commission was not required to make an 
award based solely on the plaintifTs evidence; 
but it was the responsibility of the commission 
to make some disposition of plaintifTs applica-
tion for an award and it was the prerogative of 
the commission to make a determination upon 
the evidence in the light of the decision of the 
Supreme Court or to order and hold a supple-
mental hearing to allow the parties to present 
additional evidence. Hackford v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 12 Utah 2d 250, 364 P.2d 1091 
(1961). 
Effect of 1982 amendment 
The 1982 amendment of this section, making 
the granting of a hearing discretionary, does 
not enlarge or destroy vested or contractual 
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R4W-2.11 INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
R490-M1. Hospital Tees Separate 
Fees covering hospital care shall be separate from 
those for professional services and shall not extend 
beyond the actual necessary hospital care. When it 
becomes evident that the patient needs DO further 
hospital treatment, he must be discharged. All bill-
In** must be properly itemized and coded. . . 
R490-2-12. Caartes for Special Drags, «*-
Charges for reasonably prescribed and administ-
ered supplies shall be paid upon receipt of an item-
ized, coded billing. •••• .• -
It490-2-13. Caarfes for Ordinary Dregs, fit. 
Fees covering ordinary dressing materials or drugs 
used in treatment shall not be charged separately but 
shall be included in the amount allowed for office 
dressings or treatment. If the record of the case 
shows that it was necessary to use an extraordinary 
amount of dressing materia) or drugs, as in treating 
large infected wounds or bums, these extra dressing 
materials or drugs will be paid for at coat. 
R490-2-14. Fees for UascbeduWd Procedam 
Fees for medical or surgical procedures not app-
earing in the Commission's current fee schedule 
publication are subject to the Commission's appr-
oval and should be submitted to the Commission 
when the physician and employer or Insurance 
carrier do not agree on the value of the service. 
Such fees shall be in proportion as nearly as pract-
icable to fees for similar services appearing in this 
R490-M5. Deatal lajarlca ' -!•«.• /•• 
Where a worker sustains an accident in the course 
of his employment resulting in the loss of or injury 
to teeth, making dental work necessary, the injured 
worker shall consult a dental surgeon and receive 
such first aid as may be necessary to preserve, if 
possible, the normal function of the injured teeth. 
The dental surgeon shall then file with the insurance 
earner a report setting forth the nature of the injury 
together with an estimate of the cost of restoration. 
The dental surgeon shall not proceed with the rest-
oration until authority has been granted by the ins-
urance carrier, provided, however, that if an empl-
oyer maintains a medical staff or designates a 
company doctor, the employee shall first report to 
that medical staff or medical officer and be guided 
by directions then given. If the carrier refuses 
payment at the level estimated by the dental 
surgeon, the employee may choose to pay the diff-
erence jand seek adjudication by Application for 
Hearing. A dental surgeon may choose to settle for 
the payment allowed, or the carrier shall direct the 
employee to a dental surgeon who will provide bis 
services at the payment level specified by the carrier. 
Rm-M4. Amtmlaact Charges 
Ambulance charges must not eicecd the rates 
adopted by the State Emergency Medical Service 
Com mission for similar services. • , ' " * • 
R490-M7. Travel ABowaace/Ter Dsttt ^ 
A. An employee who, based upon his/her phy-
sician's advice, requires hospital, medical, surgical, 
or consultant services for injuries arising out of or 
In the course of employment and who is authorized 
by the self-Insurer, the carrier, or the Industrial 
Commission of Utah to obtain such services from a 
physician and/or hospital shall be entitled to: 
(1) Actual and reasonable subsistence expenses not 
to exceed S15 per day for meals and not to exceed 
•** — ^.„ t^, tfwtt'ini. orovided: 
UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE 
CODF 1*17 1*1 
a. The employee travels to a community other 
than his/her own place of residence and the dist-
ance from said community and the employee's 
home prohibits return by 10:00 p.m. and 
b. The absence from home is necessary at the 
normal hour for the meal billed; and 
(2) Reasonable travel expenses, regardless of dis-
tance, amounting to the lesser of; 
• » r» . »i , . - . . V . - , \ J . v . 
a. Taxi fare, 
b. Bus fart, 
c. Train fare, or 
d. $.20 per mile for private conveyance.' 
B. This rule applies to all travel to and from 
medical care with the following restrictions: 
(1) The carrier is not required to reimburse the 
injured employee more often than every three 
months,unless . -. ". ...;' 
a. More than SI00 is involved or 
b. The case is about to be closed, and 
(2) All travel must be by the most direct route and 
to the nearest location where adequate treatment is 
reasonably available. 
(3) Travel may not be required between the hours 
of 10:00 p.m. and 6.00 a.m., unless approved by the 
Commission. 
(4) The Industrial Commission shall have jurisdi-
ction to resolve all disputes. 
R490-2-1S. GaldeUnes for Utilization of Medical 
Paad 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the 
Commission adopts the following guidelines in det-
ermining the necessity of submitting a case to s 
medical panel: :*,.>. 
A. A panel will be utilized where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues are 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of rxnnanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% of 
the whole person; or 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temp-
orary total cutoff date which vary more than ninety 
(90) days; or 
(c) Medical expenses In controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
2. In the opinion of the Commission, the medical 
issues are so intertwined with the events that s det-
ermination of whether an accident has occurrtd 
cannot be made without fix\\ resolving the medical 
considerations. ' 
J. Where, in the opinion of the Commission, the 
evidence is insufficient for the Commission to mak' 
a final determination, the Commission may require 
an independent medical evaluation, cost $ "jjjj 
assessed against the employer and/or Second 
Injury Fund. . 
4. A hearing on objections to the panel repon 
may be scheduled if there is a proffer of ™»xM 
medical testimony or evidence showing • oeea » 
clarify the medical panel report. . ^ 
3. The Commission may authorize an tnjw* 
worker to be examined by another physician for mc 
purpose of obtaining a further medical w*^ "?™* 
or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues tf^ 
Ived. and to obtain a report addressing u ~ 
medical issues in all cases where: J tnedw 
(a) The treating physician has failed or reiusco 
give an impairment rating; . . . ^ „ 
(b) The employer or doctor considers we **»* 
be non-industrial; .^ v : . -r^ - l : *" 
• SS75 
UTAH ADMlNlSTHATlVt 
CODE munt ^ 
(c) A substantial injustice tnay^cll 
further evaluation. 
R490-M9. Notice to Health Cart Pro 
Any not.ee from a carrier denyint 1 
must be mailed to the Commissi 
provider. Where it car, be shown, 
medical care provider and the injured 
received a denial of further care by 
earner or self-insured employer, fur 
may be performed at the expense of 
Any future ratification of the denial 
usion will not be considered a retro* 
will serve to uphold the force and 
previous denial notice. 
E490-2-20. Medical Records ' 
Medical practitioners shall provi 
medical reeords to the partJes to an for the following rates: 
A. Tht first 20 copies at $.$0 each an. 
B. the remainder at $.35 each fo 
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RI90-2-1*. Notice lo Health Cart f r o riders 
Any notice from a carrier denying further Lability 
oust be mailed to the Commission and the patient 
on the same day as it is mailed to the health care 
provider. Where it can be shown, In fact, that a 
medical care provider and the injured employee have 
received a denial of further care by the insurance 
carrier or self-insured employer, further treatment 
may be performed at the expense of the employee. 
Any future ratification of the denial by the Coram-
asion will not be considered a retroactive denial but 
•ill serve to uphold the force and effect of the 
previous denial notice. 1 • . , 
1490-2-20. Medical Records " . 
Medical practitioners shall provide copies o f 
ocdical records to the parties to an industrial case 
for the following rates: 
A. The first 20 copies at $.50 each and 
the remainder at $.35 each for copies made 
from microfilmed records, and 
C. $.25 each for copies made from originals. 
D. These charges are designed to cover both the 
costs of copying and the wages of staff doing the 
tork. 
E. Those persons or entitites entitled to copies of 
Bcedical records involving an industrial injury are: 
(I)The injured employee, , 
(2) The employer of the injured employee, 
(3) The employer'! workers' compensation Insu-
nace carrier, 
(4) The Uninsured Employer;* Fund (Default 
bdemnity Fund prior to July 1 ,19W), 
(5) The Second Injury Fund ' ' 
(6) The Industrial Commission, and 
(7) Any attorney representing any of the above in 
& industrial matter. 
F. Any other person or entity would not be enti-
W unless ordered by a Court or provided with a 
*x*rued release executed by the injured worker. 
G. The Industrial Commission will operate under 
f l Aoe sune rules in the release o f any records in its 
fib. . 
H. It i$ highly recommended that the parties to an 
adustrial case coordinate their requests for records 
toiainimue requests made of medical practitioners. 
w
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aif n 7 C tt **rint* M l h c amount necessary to 
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^ ^ j o f an industrial accident or occupational 
XtJ^ °"* l n o f w m c h commenced prior to the 
1°!re*rv«d«erminatfon. • . .--. 
• l a o L n T f ^ Exce$$ , n t u r »r ice it defined as the 
' *5aaul*?l4 I n c f r «l u , r ^ to cover the total 
^ r ' v 0 ; 1 ^ compensation benefits for all 
»»yiWc for a given rj^ flrwi «f itm- ^:.K .U^ 
employer retaining an obligation for a designated 
amount as a deductible and the insurance company 
paying all amounts due thereafter up to a maximum 
total obligation. 
C. Specific Excess Insurance is defined as the 
amount of insurance required to cover the workers* 
compensation benefits arising out of a specific occ-
urrence (accident) or occupational disease under the 
Workers* Compensation Law with the employer 
retaining an obligation for a designated amount as a 
deductible and the insurance company assuming the 
obligation for all amounts due thereafter up to a 
maximum total obligation. 
R490-M. Application 
A . An employer seeking authorization to become 
self-insured under the provision of section 35-1-
46(3) of the Utah Workers* Compensation Act must 
apply to the Industrial Commission, entitled 
'Application for Self Insurance.' 
B. The initial and all renewal applications must be 
completed and signed by the applicant. 
C . The Commission will require an annual 
renewal application. Renewal applications will 
require an update of the initial information. 
Renewal information must be submitted at least 
forty-five (45) days before the self-insurance 
anniversary date. Failure to file a renewal applica-
tion on time may result in an interruption o f self 
insurance privileges. 
R490-3-3. Qualifying Requirtraeata • -. •.• 
A . To quality, an employer must be in business 
for a period of not less than five yean and shall 
demonstrate sufficient financial strength and liqui-
dity of the business to assure that all obligations will 
be promptly met. An employer in business less than 
five years will be considered only if a rxe-existinf 
parent corporation (in business more than five (5) 
years) guarantees the liability. In cases of merger or 
name identification change, the history of the pro-
existing entity will be considered for the five year 
requirement. Upon applying for self-insurance 
privileges, the applicant must forward a current, 
certified financial statement or other proof of fina-
ncial ability to pay direct compensation and other 
expenses as provided by the Utah Code Annotated. 
Title 35. Mergers occurring after an entity is self-
insured will require a new application by the merged 
entity. However, entities whose financial informa-
tion can be obtained from Dun and Bradstreet will 
not be required to file financial statements unless 
clarification or supplemental statements axe deemed 
appropriate or necessary. 
B. Specific or aggregate excess insurance with 
policy limits and retention amounts acceptable are 
required as a condition of approval and continua-
tion of self-insurance privileges. -
C. A minimum $100,000.00 surety bond, an irre-
vocable letter of credit, or other acceptable security 
shall be required of each self-insurer. 
D . N o corporate surety shall be eligible to write 
self-insurers' surety bonds or excess insurance 
unless authorized to transact such business in this 
state. 
E. Surety bonds must be issued on a prescribed 
form and shall be exchanged or replaced with 
another surety bond only if sixty days notice o f 
termination of liability is given by the bonding 
company. The replacement bond must be issued o n 
a form as pre scribed by the Commission. N o repl-
acements will be authorir^d hv iK*> rv«*—:. . :— 
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Hearing Room 334, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on July 21, 
1987, at 10:00 a.m.; same being pursuant to Order and 
Notice of the Commission. 
Gilbert A- Martinez, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant was present and represented by Joseph 
C. Foley, Attorney at Law. 
The defendants were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd, 
Attorney at Law. 
The Second Injury Fund was not present at the hearing. 
i At the commencement of the hearing, the parties set forth the issues 
to be resolved by the Administrative Law Judge, which include the following: 
1. Whether the industrial incident of February 5, 1987, 
constitutes a compensable industrial accident under 
the Utah Workers* Compensation Act? 
2. Whether or not the applicant is entitled to temporary 
total disability as a direct result of the industrial 
accident of February 5, 1987? 
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INTERIM ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
3. Whether liability should be apportioned between the 
defendant employer and the defendant Second Injury 
Fund? 
4. Attorney's fees and interest, pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-78 and 35-1-87. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the factual and medical issues were 
taken under advisement by the Administrative Law Judge. This case was diaried 
for thirty (30) days in order to allow the defendant employer and its insurer 
an opportunity to investigate the validity of the applicant's claim, regarding 
the actual weight of the object the applicant lifted at the time of his injury. 
Based upon the testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, 
including the investigative report of the defendants dated August 5, 1987, and 
good cause appearing herein, the Administrative Law Judge finds as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The Administrative Law Judge hereby finds that the applicant in this 
matter, Douglas Youngfield, sustained an injury by accident on February 5, 
1987, during the course of employment with the defendant employer, Smith & 
Edwards Company. On the date of the industrial accident, the applicant was 
performing his regular job duties as a stock clerk. At that time, the appli-
cant was lifting a box of shotgun shells containing 25 small boxes of shells. 
The applicant testified that he lifted the box of shotgun shells from a cart 
to place the box onto a pallet. As the applicant lifted the box of shotgun 
shells and turned to the left to set the box onto a pallet, he felt a sharp 
pain into his low back, with pain radiating down into his right leg. The 
applicant was standing erect at the time of the injury, holding the box, and 
he felt the pain as he started to bend over to place the box of shotgun shells 
onto the pallet. The applicant testified that he did not know the exact 
weight of the box of shotgun shells, but estimated the weight to be approxi-
mately 75 pounds. He estimated the range of the weight of the box of shotgun 
shells to be between 75 to 100 pounds. After the hearing, the defendants were 
allowed an opportunity to investigate the claim and determine the exact weight 
of the box of shotgun shells. In an Affidavit dated August 10, 1987, Gary 
Uttf investigator for the defendant insurer, stated that Mike Casey, an 
employee of Smith & Edwards, and himself weighed the case of shotgun shells by 
using a scale maintained at the employer's premises. According to the Affida-
vit, the weight of the case of shotgun shells was 47-1/2 pounds, not the 75 
pounds as estimated by the claimant in this matter. 
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PACE THREE 
Following this alleged industrial accident, the applicant sought chi-
ropractic care from Richard Barton. The applicant received fifteen chiroprac-
tic treatments for his low back problems from Dr. Barton between February 7, 
1987f to May of 1987. See Exhibit "A-2". 
On February 16, 1987, the applicant visited Craig K. Julien, M.D.. 
See Exhibit MA-4". On February 26, 1987, the applicant underwent a magnetic 
resonance imaging test of his lumbar spine at the St. Benedict's Hospital. 
The MRI test of the lumbar spine showed the following impression: 
"Small focal herniation, L5-S1 rightward." 
See Exhibit •tA-5M. 
By way of history, the applicant testified he had prior low back 
problems before this industrial accident. In November of 1983, he visited a 
chiropractor in the State of Colorado for low back problems. The applicant 
received chiropractic care from Rick D. Weum, D.C., at the Colorado Springs 
Chiropractic Center. The applicant received twelve treatments for low back 
pain and shoulder probl ems from November 17, 1983, to May of 1984. On cross-
examination, it was brought out that the applicant had low back problems 
dating back to 1977, when he was treated at the St. Benedict's Hospital for 
low back problems. In 1977, the applicant underwent x-rays of the lumbar 
spine regarding his low back problems. 
In regard to non-related health problems, the applicant testified 
that he has a special skin disease entitled •'Scleroderma Morphea." This skin 
disease was diagnosed in April of 1983, when the applicant was serving in the 
military at Fort Carson. The applicant testified that the Veteran's Adminis-
tration has awarded him a 10% disability award for the skin disease, which has 
the potential of being terminal. The applicant receives approximately $69.00 
per month from the Veteran's Administration for this skin disease. 
> 
j In July of 1985, the applicant sustained injuries to his neck and 
mid-back as a result of an automobile accident when he was rear ended. The 
applicant testified that he received chiropractic treatment from Dr. Margolies 
from July of 1985, to' October of 1985. The applicant testified that a per-
sonal injury claim has been filed and is still pending. 
Following the current industrial accident of February 5, 1987, it 
appears from the medical records that the applicant has received basically 
chiropractic treatment. In addition, the applicant underwent the magnetic 
resonance imaging test at the St. Benedict's Hospital. Furthermore, on March 
10, 1987, the applicant had a one time evaluation from Dr. B. E. Allison, 
orthopedic surgeon. 
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At the time of the industrial incident of February 5, 1987, the appl-
icant, who is a 32-year-old male, was earning a weekly wage of $219.48 per 
week. The applicant was not married, however, he had one dependent child 
under the age of eighteen. Based upon this weekly wage and one dependent, the 
applicant qualifies for a compensation rate at $151.00 per week. The appli-
cant was born on December 17, 1954, and his Social Security Number is 
528-92-1497. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
The key issue in this case is whether or not the applicant sustained 
a compensable industrial accident on February 5, 1987, during the course of 
employment with the defendant employer. Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-45, 
provides in pertinent part the following: 
••Every employee. . . who is injured. . . by accident 
arising out of or in the course of employment. . . shall be 
entitled to receive and shall be paid (compensation). . . " 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act fails to define what constitutes 
an injury "by accident". Since 1917, the Utah Supreme Court has attempted to 
provide guidelines regarding the definition of an accident. In the recent 
case of Allen v. Industrial Commission, 46 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1986), the 
Utah Supreme Court defined an accident as follows: 
•••""••. . . A n accident is an unexpected or unintended 
occurrence that may be either the cause or the result of 
the injury.M 
In other words, an accident Is an "unexpected resulf, regardless of 
whether it is produced by a usual or an unusual event. This follows the def-
inition of accident which was articulated in Carlins v. Industrial Commission. 
399 P.2d 202 (Utah 1965), where the Utah Supreme Court held that a compensable 
accident includes "the possibility that due to exertion, stress or other 
repetitive cause, a climax might be reached in such a manner as to properly 
fall" within the coverage of Section 35-1-45. 
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the Administrative Law 
Judge finds no difficulty in determining that the low back injury sustained by 
Youngfield occurred by accident. Certainly, Mr. Youngfield did not intend 
that he should develop low back problems in the course of performing his 
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regular job duties, which included stocking and lifting boxes of shotgun 
shells. Under the standard of Allent his injuries were the unexpected result 
of exertions which occurred at work and in the course of employment. 
This conclusion, however, does not completely answer the question of 
whether Mr. Youngfield is entitled to benefits under Section 35-1-45. As the 
Utah Supreme Court explained in Allen, the second element of a compensable 
accident requires proof of a causal connection between the injury and the 
worker's employment duties. The majority opinion in Allen defines the term 
••accident" to mean "unexpected result." The majority then defines the term 
"arising out of or in the course of employment" to impose legal and medical 
causation requirements. See U.C.A., Section 35-1-45. Unfortunately, the 
requirement of "legal causation" has two different meanings, depending upon 
the physical condition of the employee at the time that he was employed by the 
employer. A worker having no pre-existing incapacities need only prove that 
the accident was caused by a "usual or ordinary exertion." However, in cases 
where the injured employee was suffering from pre-existing conditions, legal 
causation has a different meaning. Such a worker may receive compensation 
only if the employment contribution to the internal low back breakdown is 
"greater than that of non-employment life." Very simply, the Utah Supreme 
Court concluded in Allen that where the claimant suffers from a pre-existing 
condition, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal 
causation. Where there is no pre-existing condition, a usual or ordinary 
exertion is sufficient. 
In the case at bar, the medical records contained in Exhibit "A-3", 
and "D-l" show that the applicant was suffering from pre-existing conditions 
into his low back. Even the applicant testified on the record that he had 
chiropractic care for low back problems from November of 1983, to May of 1984, 
at the Colorado Springs Chiropractic Center. On cross-examination, it was 
brought out that the applicant had low back problems dating back to 1977, when 
he was treated at the St. Benedict's Hospital for low back pain. Furthermore, 
in July of 1985, the applicant sustained injuries to his back as the result of 
an automobile accident when he was rear-ended. This evidence clearly estab-
lishes that the applicant had a pre-existing condition in his low back, and 
therefore the Administrative Law Judge is required to apply the higher 
standard of legal causation as set forth in the Allen case. 
The key issue in this case now turns to the question of whether or 
not the lifting of an object weighing 4 7-1/2 pounds satisfies the higher legal 
standard for establishing legal causation. To meet the legal causation requi-
rement involving a case with pre-existing conditions, the injured employee 
must establish that the employment contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in everyday life. Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 46 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1986) affirmed in Specialty Cabinet 
Company v. Montoya. 47 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Utah 1986). 
~7 r> « 
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In cases involving internal injuries such as low back problems, the 
issue is proof of a causal connection between the injury and the industrial 
event. Compensable injuries can be identified by first considering legal 
cause and then its medical cause. The standard of proof of a causal 
connection between the industrial incident and the complaints of pain is the 
preponderance of the evidence. Where the injured employee suffers from a pre-
existing condition, such as the case at bar, an "unusual or extraordinary 
exertion" is required to prove legal causation. Unusual or extraordinary 
exertion must be defined objectively. The unusual exertion must be compared 
with non-employment life, instead of comparing it with employment activities 
that this or any other employee would have been engaged in. The unusual 
exertion must involve an exertion greater than that normally performed during 
non-employment life by a Twentieth Century person. 
Whether lifting an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds constitutes "unusual 
exertion" for a Twentieth Century person in non-employment life is difficult 
to answer. The Administrative Law Judge takes judicial notice that lifting 
objects weighing 10, IS and 20 pounds would not satisfy the unusual exertion 
test. There is a presumption that the Twentieth Century person performs non-
employment lifting activities using weights in the amount of 10, IS or 20 
pounds. As the court pointed out in Allen, typical activities and exertions 
expected of men and women in the Twentieth Century include taking full garbage 
cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a flat 
tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height, and climbing the 
stairs in buildings. In a footnote, the court points out that lifting a 20 
pound object does not satisfy legal causation in those cases where the emplo-
yee had a pre-existing condition. See Footnote No. 8, Allen v. Industrial 
Commission, 46 Utah Adv. Rep. 12. The Administrative Law Judge also takes 
judicial notice that lifting objects weighing 80, 90, or 100 pounds consti-
tutes an "unusual or extraordinary exertion" for a Twentieth Century person in 
non-employment life. The difficult question is whether lifting an object 
weighing 4 7-1/2 pounds constitutes unusual exertion to meet the higher 
standard of legal causation. Obviously, 47-1/2 pounds falls somewhere between 
the 20 pounds which would not be compensable and the 80 pounds which would be 
compensable. 
• / 
In analyzing whether an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds constitutes 
••unusual exertion" requires a determination of which classification of 
Twentieth Century individuals we are addressing. As a former Marine in the 
United States Marine Corp, it is obvious that U. S. Marines as a 
classification of individuals would consider lifting a 47-1/2 pound object as 
being certainly a minor exertion for a puny weakling or a non-macho type. 
This, of course, does not apply to all groups. During the past 1-1/2 years, 
this Administrative Law Judge has had the opportunity of visiting a nursing 
facility on a weekly basis. Using the patients at the nursing facility as 
* j *->•*-»•* 
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another classification group, it certainly would be impossible for them to 
lift an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds. In many cases, these individuals find 
it difficult to lift a glass of water. This certainly does not suggest that 
nursing home patients are inferior citizens; they simply cannot exert physical 
strength like other groups of individuals. 
What about classifications based upon age and gender. Obviously, a 
25 to 35-year-old individual would have much less difficulty in lifting a 
47-1/2 pound object than would an individual between the ages of 65 and 75. 
Although sex has never been a consideration in determining the compensability 
of workers* compensation claims, many could effectively argue that a male 
would have less exertion in lifting a 47-1/2 pound object than would a 
female. 
Very simply, who is this Twentieth Century individual, and what are 
the typical activities expected of him or her during non-employment life? 
Perhaps, too much emphasis is given to the exact weight of the object being 
lifted. As stated above, a 20 pound object is considered easy to lift and an 
80 pound object must be considered as extraordinary exertion. But, this may 
not be entirely an accurate reflection of how an injury may occur. The weight 
of the object is solely one factor. Let us not forget that there are four 
factors: 
(1) Weight of the object being moved; 
(2) The motion being performed (proper or improper ways of 
lifting);; 
(3) The duration of the motion; and 
(4) Position of the person performing the exertion. 
By utilizing these four factors, an illustration perhaps can assist 
us in determining what constitutes an unusual or extraordinary exertion. 
Professional body builders and weight lifters teach you that the amount of 
weight to be lifted during an exercise is proportionately determined by the 
motion to be performed and the amount of repetitions in the exercise. 
Obviously, a weight lifter can use greater weight when performing squats and 
dead lifts, than can be lifted when performing french curls or lateral 
raises. An experienced body builder may use 400 pounds in squatting, but only 
use 50 pounds in performing lateral raises. In addition, the duration or 
numbers of repetition that the individual will be lifting the object has to be 
considered. A body builder performing one-arm dumbbells with the weight of 
47-1/2 pounds may find the first five to ten repetitions to be fairly easy, 
however, after he has reached the 25th or 30th motion, his muscle becomes weak 
and the dumbbell weighing 4 7-1/2 pounds takes on the appearance that it weighs 
close to 100 pounds. This is when an individual is susceptible to injury. At 
a time when the muscle can no longer control the weight due to fatigue, and 
the weight of the object places complete stress upon the tendons, elbow and 
nerves. 
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In the case at bar, the evidence clearly establishes that the 
specific weight of the object (a box of shotgun shells) lifted by the 
applicant at the time of the allged industrial injury was 47-1/2 pounds. 
There was no evidence presented at the time of the hearing to establish that 
the applicant was utilizing improper motion in lifting this weight. 
Obviously, the proper means of lifting an object from the floor is to bend 
your knees, rather than bend at the waist and place the full stress on your 
lower back. In addition, there was no evidence to establish that the duration 
of the lifting motion was substantial or significant. The applicant lifted 
the 47-1/2 pound object once, not several times, and did not carry the box of 
shotfun shells any distance. The applicant solely lifted a box of shotgun 
shells from a cart to a pallet, and as he turned to set the box on the pallet, 
he felt a sharp pain in his low back. Furthermore, there was not evidence 
elicited to establish that the applicant was in an unusual position at the 
time that he was performing this lifting activity. In the case at bar, the 
applicant argues from the record that lifting an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds 
is certainly an unusual or extraordinary exertion without other factors. 
The Administrative Law Judge hereby rules that the applicant, who is 
a 32-year old male, is entitled to Utah workers* compensation benefits as a 
direct result of his industrial accident of February 5, 1987, on the basis 
that lifting an object weighing 47-1/2 pounds represents an "unusual and 
extraordinary exertion" to establish proof of legal causation. Very simply, 
the Administrative Law Judge finds that a Twentieth Century person performing 
non-employment life activities would not be generally expected to lift an 
object of 47-1/2 pounds during a normal day away from work. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendants, Smith & Edwards Company 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay the applicant, Douglas 
Youngfield, temporary total disability compensation at the rate of $151.00 per 
week for 12.286 weeks, or a total of $1,855.19, as temporary total disability 
for a period from February 8, 1987, to May 4, 1987, (the date the applicant 
returned to work), pursuant to Section 35-1-65, U.C.A.; said amount to be paid 
in a lump sum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Smith & Edwards Company 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah shall pay interest on the amounts 
awarded under this Order at the rate of 87. per annum from the date when each 
benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable, pursuant to 
Section 35-1-78, U.C.A. 
* * ^ f 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any claims for a potential permanent 
partial disability, under Section 35-1-66, U.C.A., shall be reserved until the 
applicant has been rated by a qualified physician or orthopedic surgeon. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants. Smith & Edwards Company 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay all of the reasonable 
medical expenses incurred as a direct result of the industrial accident of May 
5, 1987; said expenses to be paid in accordance with the Medical and Surgical 
Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Smith & Edwards Company 
and/or Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, shall pay Joseph C. Foley, attorney 
for the applicant, the sum of $371.04, as attorney fees in this case under 
Section 35-1-87, U.C.A.; said amount to be deducted from the aforesaid award 
of the applicant and to be paid in a lump sum directly to the attorney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for review of the foregoing 
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof, 
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so 
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal. 
^Ma Gilbert A. Martinez 
Administrative Law Judge 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
< ^ ^ day of October, 1987. 
ATTEST; 
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Blame C Palmer, Director 
Rodney C Smith Assistant Director 
560 So-tn 300 East 
Post O'.'.iCy. Box 45420 
So/. Lakj Ztty. Uta, 184,45-0420 
November 12, 198/ 
Gilbert A. Martinez 
Administrative Law Judge 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0580 
Re: Douglas Youngfleld 
File No: 87-04673 
Inj: 02-05-87 
Empl: Smith & Edwards Co. 
Dear Judge Martinez: 
Please accept this letter as the Workers Compensation Fund's Motion For 
Review of your Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered 
on the above referenced matter on October 26, 1987. Specifically, the 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah and Smith and Edwards Co. take exception to 
your finding that the claimant herein was Involved 1n activities which 
satisfied the higher legal causation standard of the Allen accident test. 
In this case, you found that Mr. Youngfleld injured his back while 
lifting a 47 1/2 lb. box of shotgun shells. You note that there was no 
evidence of "Improper motion 1n lifting." Further, you state that there was 
no evidence that repeated lifting was Involved. Rather, Mr. Youngfield 
lifted the box of shotgun shells once, not several times, and did not carry 
the box any distance. Finally, you state that there was no evidence that 
Mr. Youngfleld was In an unusual position at the time of his onset of back 
pain. You conclude, 
, "In the case at barf the applicant argues from the record that lifting an 
, object weighing 47 1/2 lbs. Is certainly an unusual or extraordinary 
exertion without other factors." 
The defendants argue that the activity described herein 1s identical to 
the typical activities expected of men and women In the latter part of the 
20th Century. The Utah Supreme Court has outlined such activities to 
include: taking full cans of garbage to the street, lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small 
child to chest height, and climbing the stairs In buildings. On their face, 
these activities are as stressful as the one In which the claimant, 
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To substantiate our position, defendants proffer to the Industrial 
Commission the testimony of Laurie Stewart, Director of the Cottonwood 
Hospital Back Institute. Ms. Stewart holds an M.S. Degree \* Health S e r v e s 
from the University of Utah along with two B.S. Degrees, one In Physical 
Therapy from the University of Utah and one 1n Physical Education from 
Brlgham Young University. Ms. Stewart, upon reviewing :he *acts of th'.s 
"accident" as found by the Administrative Law Judge, beHovss, and would 
testify, that the activity in which Mr. Youngfield was involved placed far 
less stress on his back than such ordinary everyday living activities as 
sneezing or coughing. In fact, there is no evidence of position or movement 
tnat would suggest any magnification of the weight in Mr. Youngfield's arms 
so as to transform his activities from those involving the usual wear and 
tear of non-employment life exertions to ones involving unusual exertions. 
Obviously, unusual exertion Is needed to meet the higher legal causation 
standard in this matter. 
The Workers Compensation Fund respectfully requests that the 
Administrative Law Judge, or the entire Commission, reverse the finding of 
compensability made on October 26, 1987. Simply stated, Mr. Youngfield did 
not suffer a compensable industrial accident given his pre-existing condition 
as he failed to show the requisite higher standard of legal causat'on. 
Objectively, his activities were not unusual or extraordinary. In the 
alternative, the defendants move that this matter be re-opened and that an 
additional hearing be set. At that hearing, the defendants would produce 
Ms. Stewart for the purpose of taking her testimony and allowing 
cross-examination relative to the mechanics of Mr. Youngfield's alleged 
industrial accident. Also, If desired, the claimant could present any expert 
testimony to substantiate his claim. 
Yours truly, 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
^koLut-aaJjJ-t 
Dennis V.<5Tloyd 
Attorney at Law 
oyi/jf 
» 
cc: Joseph C. Foley, Attorney at Law, 543 25th Street, Ogden, UT 84401 
Erie V. Boorman, Adm. of Second Injury Fund 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX 3: 
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
j J u o J 3 :- J .j 0 't. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
% 
Case No: 87000510 
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* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On October 26, 1987, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial 
Commission issued Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
awarding the applicant in the above-captioned case temporary total 
compensation and medical expenses (and reserving the issue of permanent 
partial impairment benefits) related to a February 5, 1987 industrial injury. 
The Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's pre-existing low back 
condition required that the Administrative Law Judge apply the more stringent 
legal causation test as specified in Allen v the Industrial Commission. 729 
P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) in order to determine whether the applicant's injury 
occurred Mby accident" thus causing it to be compensable. That test requires 
that the applicant be injured pursuant to exertion that is greater than what 
is encountered by the average person in everyday non-employment life. After 
thoroughly discussing and analyzing the mechanics of the injury and the legal 
standard as set forth in the Allen case, the Administrative Law Judge 
determined that the applicant's lifting of a 47-1/2 lb box of shotgun shells 
was exertion sufficient to meet the Allen higher standard legal causation 
test. As result, the Administrative Law Judge found the applicant's February 
5, 1987 injury was compensable and the Administrative Law Judge awarded 
benefits. 
On November 12, 1987, pursuant to U.C.A. 35-1-82.53, counsel for the 
defendant/Workers Compensation Fund filed a Motion for Review. Counsel for 
the Fund states that the applicant's lifting injury is no different than the 
lifting activities listed in the Allen case as normal or usual exertions 
encountered by twentieth century individuals in non-employment life. As no 
unusual exertion is involved, counsel for the Workers Compensation Fund finds 
the Administrative Law Judge should have found the legal causation test was 
not met and should have denied all benefits as result. 
The Commission finds that the only issue to be reviewed is the issue 
regarding whether the mechanics of the applicant's injury shows sufficient 
exertion to establish legal causation per the Allen compensability test. The 
Commission adopts the Findings of Fact as stated by the Administrative Law 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
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Judge in the October 26f 1987 Interim Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order. In the Order, the Administrative Law Judge discusses the difficulty in 
determining what normal non-employment exertion is for the average twentieth 
century person. The variance between age and physical capacity that occurs 
within the group of all twentieth century persons is well illustrated by the 
Administrative Law Judge's discussion and the Commission agrees that what 
typifies the average person is difficult to discern. In addition, the 
Commission has commented in recent Orders on review regarding the difficulty 
of comparing the list of usual exertion activities from Allen with a 
particular injury fact scenario to determine whether the injury fits within 
the class of activities specified in Allen. Because the box lifted by the 
applicant in this case is not clearly within the Larson weight parameters 
quoted by the Supreme Court in Allen as being usual exertion, and keeping in 
mind the beneficent purpose behind workers compensation, the Commission must 
confirm the Administrative Law Judge's determination that the legal causation 
test is met in this case. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant's November 12, 1987 Motion 
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's October 25, 1987 Order 
is hereby affirmed and final with further appeal to the Court of Appeals only 
within the thirty (30) day time limit and as specified in U.C.A. 35-1-83. 
Passed by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
3)UL day of February, 1988. 
ATTEST: 
L. AJAA.lldL 
-inda J. Strasburg 
Commission Secretary 
Lenice L. Nielsen 
Commissioner 
Q ^ V ^ 
Johnyrlorez 
Coramissioner 
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